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Personhood: Law, Common Sense, and
Humane Opportunities
Helen M. Alvaré *
It is pointless to approach Professor Chatman’s argument on
its own terms (to wit, “tak[ing] our laws seriously,” or equal
application across myriad legal categories of “full personhood”
rights) because these terms are neither seriously intended nor
legally comprehensible. Instead, her essay is intended to create the
impression that legally protecting unborn human lives against
abortion opens up a Pandora’s box of legal complications so
“ridiculous” and “far-fetched” that we should rather just leave
things where they are under the federal Constitution post-Roe v.
Wade 1 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 2 This impression, in
turn, is a tool to forward Professor Chatman’s personal preference
for legal abortion—which she gives away by calling legal abortion
by its political name: “the right to choose.”
But her arguments, sounding in law, about the alleged chaos
to flow from a law protecting unborn human lives from abortion
are false on the grounds of basic legal principles concerning federal
constitutional and immigration law, as well as the legal principles
underlying state legislation and statutory interpretation. I will set
these legal principles out below before turning to the more
interesting and legally plausible matter of whether or not
lawmakers should choose to take into account both the needs of
pregnant women and the humanity of unborn life when crafting
laws affecting both, whether the situation involves immigration,
incarceration, or women’s need for financial support.
First, Professor Chatman’s reading of federal constitutional
law is erroneous. She suggests that a state law defining unborn
human lives as persons would “tie our Constitution into a knot no
* Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University
(J.D., Cornell University; M.A., The Catholic University of America; B.S.,
Villanova University).
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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court can untangle.” 3 This cannot be true. The Supreme Court has
the last word on the meaning of “person” for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “life” to persons. In Roe v.
Wade, the Court determined that the unborn were not included. 4
If state laws had the last word, then the Roe Court could not have
overturned the dozens of state laws 5 protecting unborn human
lives against killing by abortion. But it did. Today, if states like
Alabama and others legally define unborn humans as persons
protected against death by abortion, 6 either the Supreme Court
will strike down the state’s law as inconsistent with the Court’s
definitive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, or it will
overturn Roe v. Wade (and Planned Parenthood v. Casey) in order
to let states again have the last word regarding the protection due
unborn life, as they did pre-1973. In either event, the Constitution
is not “tie[d] . . . into a knot”; rather any constitutional issue will
be interpreted by the Court, as per usual. 7

3. Carliss N. Chatman, If a Fetus Is a Person, It Should Get Child Support,
Due Process and Citizenship, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 91, 97 (2020).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–58.
5. James A. Knecht, Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case
Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177,
179–81 & nn.25–30 (1972). In 1972, prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, twenty-six
states permitted abortions only to save the mother’s life. Five states only
permitted abortion to save the life of the mother or child. One state and the
District of Columbia only permitted abortion to preserve the life or health of the
mother. Eleven states permitted abortion only under the framework put forth in
the Model Penal Code revisions of 1962, which essentially allowed abortion only
if there was a “substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother, or that the child would be
born with a grave physical or mental defect; the pregnancy resulted from rape; or
the pregnancy resulted from incest or other felonious intercourse” Id. at 180
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962)). One state appeared to have banned abortion altogether, and one state only
allowed abortion to save the mother’s life or if the pregnancy resulted from rape.
Only five states had limited or no abortion law at all. Id. at 181–82. Professor
Knecht further clarified: “Semantic problems arise because the statutes state that
an unborn child has a life which may be saved, thereby implying that an unborn
child is alive, while the proponents of reform believe that a child is not alive until
it is born. The import of these statutes, however, is that they view the fetus as a
legal entity deserving of protection.” Id. at 179, n.26.
6. Alabama Human Life Protection Act, ALA. CODE 1975 §§ 26-23H-3,
26-23H-4 (2019).
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803).
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Regarding immigration law, Professor Chatman states that
“[i]n states that move the line to define life as beginning as early
as conception, personhood and citizenship will begin as soon as a
woman knows she is pregnant.” 8 She also states that this would
“creat[e] a system with two-tiered fetal citizenship.” 9 But these
statements make no sense. Despite some bold new scholarship on
the possibility that states could determine “citizenship” separately
from federal law, 10 this proposal remains in the realm of theory; it
is well known that citizenship is a matter governed by federal law.
In the words of a recent article in the Stanford Law Review: “In
many ways, the regulation of immigration is a quintessential
federal function. Developing a uniform national scheme that
dictates who may enter the United States, who must leave, and
who may become a national citizen is a power exclusively reserved
to the federal government.” 11
Professor Chatman is also mistaken on a basic principle of
legislative drafting and interpretation: state laws inevitably define
the leading terms employed in a statute to apply only within the
four corners of that statute. Of course, it is possible for a word to
have the same meaning across statutes, but only if the relevant
pieces of legislation say so. Commonly, however—and as done in
the Alabama statute 12 Professor Chatman derides—a statute says
“As used in this act, the term X means such and such.” Thus, each
statute defines its terms so as to serve the statute’s precise object.
Innumerable state statutes use the language of “person”
regarding innumerable rights and obligations, but each clearly
confines the meaning to the statutory purpose at hand: for
example, who can vote, who can enter into a contract, who can run
for office, who can commit a crime, who can suffer certain crimes,
etc. To give a highly relevant and specific example: today—when
abortion must be legal everywhere, post-Roe—many states define
unborn human beings as “persons” (whether or not eventually
8. Chatman, supra note 3, at 97.
9. Id at 96.
10. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of
State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2015).
11. Id. at 870.
12. Alabama Human Life Protection Act § 26-23H-3.
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“born alive”) for purposes of both criminal homicide laws and/or
wrongful death actions. 13 But these laws have not been interpreted
to protect unborn humans from being killed by abortion, despite
their use of the language of personhood. Instead, such laws define
“person” only for purposes of the law at hand, using language
similar to that appearing in the recent Alabama abortion statute:
“As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the
following meanings . . . .” 14 This makes eminent sense in the
present legal climate. Legislators know that abortion must be legal
as long as Roe stands, but they may still want to pass a law to
punish third parties responsible for killing the children of
pregnant women who did not seek abortion. Or—to engage more of
Professor Chatman’s examples—legislators may want to protect
unborn human beings from being killed via abortion, while
understanding as a matter of common sense that unborn humans
cannot separately obtain a trial or an arraignment. For matters of
convenience and expense, the privacy concerns of pregnant women,
or even because of the high rates of miscarriage, 15 legislators might
not want to extend Social Security or census laws to unborn lives.
But at the very same time, a state might have such a high regard
for human life at every stage that it would want to punish any
deliberate, or even negligent, killing that goes against the mother’s
will.
Turning now to the legally plausible and more intrinsically
interesting possibilities raised by Professor Chatman’s editorial:
should lawmakers choose to take the humanity of unborn life into
13. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes
Against Pregnant Women, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/86LG-3H6Q (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. Alabama Human Life Protection Act § 26-23H-3.
15. What Are the Miscarriage Rates by Week?, MED. NEWS TODAY,
https://perma.cc/XGR8-HJEW (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (generating the
following statistics on the relationship between maternal age and risk of
miscarriage: at age thirty-five there is a 15% chance of pregnancy loss, at age
forty a 35% chance, and at ages over forty-five about a 50% chance) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Miscarriage, MAYO CLINIC,
https://perma.cc/G32J-DDAK (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“About 10 to 20 percent
of known pregnancies end in miscarriage.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also ACOG Practice Bulletin: Early Pregnancy Loss, AM. C. OF
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2015) https://perma.cc/2M99-6UDY (last
visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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account when crafting laws affecting not only mothers, but also
their unborn offspring? I think the answer is a clear “yes,”—for
reasons that might appeal both to those who take the label
“pro-life” and “pro-choice.” Both women and children might benefit
from such laws.
Many of the areas of law Professor Chatman identified—
especially child support, incarceration, immigration, and tax law—
while not legally affected by personhood definitions in any abortion
ban, could be vehicles for assisting both pregnant women and their
children, although this is not how Professor Chatman uses them.
More than a few scholars have written on these subjects.
Regarding child support, for example—because pregnant
women are in need of both tangible and intangible solidarity and
support during pregnancy, and because fathers should take joint
responsibility—why not implement “preglimony,” as suggested by
law professor Shari Motro? 16 And because a pregnant woman’s
environment will affect her unborn child’s health, why not legally
require attention to the health care needs of mother and child
during incarceration? 17 And because it would be beneficial to both
16. See generally Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011)
(defining preglimony as a “preganancy-support obligation” when an unwanted
pregnancy occurs); Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917
(2010); Shari Motro, Responsibility Begins at Conception, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2012), https://perma.cc/87KV-F2VY (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The preglimony concept was originally
developed in her two law review articles.
17. See Jennifer Hahn-Holbrook et al., Placental Corticotropin-Releasing
Hormone Mediates the Association Between Prenatal Social Support and
Postpartum Depression, 1 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. 253 (2013) (noting that strong
social support from families, which includes emotional support, help with tasks
or other material assistance, and the woman feeling cared for, valued, or accepted
lowers stress hormones in pregnant women) Nazli Hossain & Elizabeth
Westerlund Triche, Environmental Factors Implicated in the Causation of
Adverse Pregnancy Outcome, 31 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 240 (2007)
(concluding that exposure to metals, such as lead, and radiation can cause
congenital defects and that mental and physical stress can lead to birth defects,
low birth weight, preterm delivery, and preeclampsia). The neighborhood a
woman lives in may also impact the pregnancy by inducing psychological distress,
depression, or anxiety. The socioeconomic impact of a poor neighborhood may also
impact health by having less access to health care, lower quality food in grocery
stores, and less outside space that is safe for exercise. Women who live in
disadvantaged neighborhoods have more stress, less emotional support, and were
more likely to participate in unhealthy activities such as smoking, drinking
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the pregnant woman and the child to have the support of both of
his or her parents both during the pregnancy and afterwards, why
not take a woman’s pregnancy into account in immigration—in
favor of granting her rights to live in the United States—especially
if the father resides here? 18 And because having children is
expensive and involves costs both during pregnancy and
thereafter, why not grant tax breaks recognizing the dependency
of a child even before he or she is born? 19
alcohol, or doing drugs. Conversely, women in safer or more stable areas have
lower stress, more ties to the neighborhood, and healthier pregnancies. See Marie
Lynn Miranda et al., Environmental Contributions to Disparities in Pregnancy
Outcomes, 31 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 67, 68 (2009) (explaining that stressors such
as poor health care, unemployment, high crime rates, high poverty rates, poor
housing, and low income can have negative health effects on both the mother and
the pregnancy).
18. In general, international law respects the right of people to marry and
have a family. See Gallya Lahav, International Versus National Constraints in
Family-Reunification Migration Policy, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 349, 355 (1997)
(“The notion that ‘the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State’ is often claimed to derive
from natural law and is enshrined in international law.”). Family
immigration— especially if the immigrant does not work outside the
home— supports the “care economy,” which promotes the well-being of the family
in general, including the physical, cognitive, and emotional development of the
household. Immigrants who come to the United States via a family-based visa
tend to have higher earning growth. Further, the creation of immigrant
communities eases assimilation, promotes the formation of new businesses, and
may revitalize rundown neighborhoods. See Fact Sheet: The Advantages of
Family-Based Immigration, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 14, 2013),
https://perma.cc/ZKJ9-53HF (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“Families are crucial to
the social and economic incorporation of newcomers.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The U.N. Expert Group report also explains
that prolonged separation can lead to family members feeling guilty that they
abandoned their family to pursue economic or social gain. Family separation may
also lead to immigrants feeling unsettled and spending more time trying to
immigrate their family members than on integrating into society. See Denise L.
Spitzer, Family Migration Policies and Social Integration, U.N. EXPERT GROUP
FAM.
POLICIES
FOR
INCLUSIVE
SOCIETIES
4
(May
2018),
https://perma.cc/6A9P-QALV (PDF) (explaining that family members provide
support to migrants and recognizing that “[p]rolonged familial separation can
have deleterious effects on family members, adding stress to intimate and
parent-child relationships and creating or exacerbating economic difficulties”);
see also Philip E. Wolgin, Family Reunification Is the Bedrock of U.S. Immigration
Policy,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb.
12, 2018,
10:41 AM),
https://perma.cc/XS4D-WG94 (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (explaining that family
unity has historically been a shared value across ideological divisions) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. If a woman does not have health insurance, ultrasounds and other
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None of these eminently humanitarian policies are required by
an abortion ban that defines a “person” to include unborn human
lives, but all would be morally consistent with such a piece of
legislation. In an ideal world, whether an advocate labels herself
“pro-choice” or “pro-life,” she would recommend consistently
life-giving, family-friendly laws to benefit both women and their
unborn daughters and sons. Professor Chatman missed this
opportunity in her haste to portray Alabama-style legislation
designed to protect unborn human life from abortion as irrational
and impossible.

prenatal visits and tests cost around $2,000. Prenatal vitamins are around $15
per month. This does not include basic supplies for the baby, including clothes,
diapers, a car seat, etc. For example, a pack of 250 diapers is around $40.
Childbirth education classes range from $50 to $200. (prices vary). If a woman
has a cesarean section, it costs almost $16,000. A vaginal birth costs around
$9,600. See Heather Hatfield, What It Costs to Have a Baby, WEBMD,
https://perma.cc/B4V8-42E9 (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (detailing the expenses
associated with having a baby) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also Hillary Hoffower & Taylor Borden, How Much It Costs to Have a Baby in
Every State, Whether You Have Health Insurance or Don’t, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9,
2019, 12:56 PM), https://perma.cc/4BBR-GEWF (last visited Feb. 12, 2020)
(noting that the average cost of giving birth in the United States is $10,808) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

